Monday, May 2, 2011

Fuck Pakistan, Part 2

Partly because of recent events, and partly because I thought that the first version of "Fuck Pakistan" was poorly written, I feel compelled to expand and refine my argument.  


A day or two after my first post on Pakistan, Pakistan quite obligingly encouraged Afghanistan to end relations with the US.  While it might seem a little ungrateful for Pakistan, a country that has received billions of dollars in aid from the US, to encourage Afghanistan to end its relationship with the US, it actually makes sense on a certain level.  To be sure, some of the motivation for the request was caused by the need for Pakistani politicians to cater to a population (and a certain segment of the military, which has a great deal of clout) distaste for America, and particularly the American military.  The rest may be explained by Pakistan's desire for geopolitical dominance of the region, its tendency to view Afghanistan as space into which Pakistan's military may fall back in the unlikely event of an Indian invasion, and its tendency to view Afghanistan as a place in which to train terrorists to attack India.  


In any case, the statement may safely be viewed as an assurance that if Pakistan has its way, Afghanistan will be a client state ruled by Pakistani policy.  Given the fact that Pakistan's foreign policy has turned vast swaths of Pakistan into lawless lands with no infrastructure and a great deal of sectarian and religious violence, this doesn't bode well for Afghanistan.  


Obviously the biggest recent news item for the region was the operation in which Osama bin Laden was killed.  According to the official statement regarding the operation, it was a unilateral US military operation that inserted itself into a giant, million dollar fortress outside Islamabad without the knowledge of the Pakistani government.  The fact that bin Laden was hiding just outside the capitol of Pakistan raises a few questions about the complicity of the Pakistanis in harboring bin Laden.  


In fact, I would go so far as to say that the Pakistanis absolutely knew he was there.  He was hiding in a giant fortress, eight times the size of neighboring homes, with 18 to 20 foot high walls topped by barbed wire, that didn't have telephone or internet access.  In a town that is home to numerous retired military officers, Pakistan's military academy, and a popular tourist destination.  Upon the construction of a giant fortress in your neighborhood, the reasonable reaction is to ask yourself, "I wonder what's going on there."  If you happen to be an active or retired general, you have the resources or connections to people who have the resources to find out.  Since it's been there since 2005, you would have several years to pay attention to the comings and goings, to develop quality intelligence, and to take action.  


But no one did, because Pakistan's government, and particularly its intelligence and military establishment, have no problems harboring terrorists.  


At this point, I'd say that it's obvious that the strategic interests of Pakistan and the United States only concur that the US shouldn't invade and occupy Pakistan.  In every other respect, they diverge.  Pakistan remains committed to terrorism and a policy tool, is disinterested in equality, fosters rabid fundamentalism, and because of these commitments, foments violence and discord domestically.  As soon as the US leaves the region, they will foment violence and discord in Afghanistan as well, as the tragic and unavoidable side effect of the policies that they pursue.  


This is a shame, because Pakistan is clearly the most important nation, strategically, in Central Asia, and if oil is removed from the equation, probably the most important Muslim country on Earth.  It's important because it's a nuclear power and long-time state sponsor of terror.  


Accordingly, our attention in the region must never forget Pakistan's importance, and the short-term stability of Afghanistan should not be pursued at the expense of the long-term stability of Pakistan.  Moreover, we need enforce our strategic will on Pakistan to divert them from the suicidal course currently set by their policies.  


The most effective way to do this is not to invade them.  Rather, we need to recognize that we have the incontestable upper hand in the relationship, and use that position of dominance to effect change.  We need to stop coercing the IMF to lend Pakistan billions, cease our flow of aid money, and foster our military relationship with India until and unless Pakistan cracks down on Islamic militants in the short term, and begins to build the infrastructure and institutions necessary for its long-term success.  

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