Fuck Pakistan

Somehow, Pakistan has found itself an ally of the United States in our war on terror.  This has always struck me as a little odd, given that all of the reasons used to justify the invasion of Iraq (WMDs, links to Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations, to keep innocent people from being unnecessarily killed) are actually true of Pakistan.  Absolutely, intelligence-agencies-skewing-the-evidence-to-justify-an-invasion-proof true.  It has nuclear weapons.  In fact, it proliferated nuclear technology to place like Iran, Libya, and North Korea.  One of its scientists, who was partially responsible for the development of Pakistan's nuclear weapons, knows Osama bin Laden!  He tried to help Al Qaeda get nuclear weapons (unsuccessfully).  Pakistan has a long history of supporting terrorist organizations, including the Taliban.  They supported the Taliban so much, as a matter of fact, they while we were invading Afghanistan, the Pakistani government was airlifting members of the Taliban (and likely Al Qaeda leadership) out of harm's way.  


Lately, our relationship with Pakistan has been a little strained.  It's strained because we continue to kill Islamic militants in Pakistan with drone strikes, and because the CIA has apparently been conducting clandestine operations inside Pakistan without Pakistan's permission.  Never mind the fact that its army and intelligence services consistently demure when asked to target certain militant organizations, like the Haqqani network.  Never mind that we have given Pakistan billions of dollars in aid.  


Here is the crux of the matter.  Pakistan's government, and particularly the ISI and the army, have a worldview that is predicated by two principles:  India is Pakistan's most significant threat, and violence is the best way to do deal with the threat.  In terms of conventional military technology, this led to the development of nuclear weapons and the continued pursuit of effective delivery systems for those weapons.  This, in and of itself, is enough to dissuade India from any invasion plans that it might have had in the past.  


In terms of military force of a more limited scale, Pakistan views Afghanistan as a minor fiefdom upon which to fall back in case of invasion (unnecessary, given the mutually assured destruction provided by nukes).  It also views Afghanistan, the Northwest Frontier Provinces, and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas as valid training grounds for its favored weapon of choice, terrorism.  Pakistan became an ally in the fight against the Russians to defend Afghanistan as a means of defense in depth.  It favored particular mujahideen organizations, backed a weak Afghan government after the departure of the Soviets, supported the Taliban, and funded al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations' training camps in Afghanistan as a means of pursuing the terrorist option.  


In practical terms, this has meant supporting the proliferation of fundamentalist madrassas that serve as the primary means of education because they provide an ideological framework for militant extremism, and separating terrorists into "good" and "bad" terrorists.  


For example, during the first few years of our occupation of Afghanistan, the Taliban was viewed as a defunct organization that had been crippled during the invasion, whereas Al Qaeda was viewed as the primary threat.  Accordingly, the Taliban was sheltered from Pakistani security forces and largely left alone to regroup and rebuild itself, while members of al Qaeda were killed, captured, or escaped the country by bribing corrupt officials.  While Pakistan has begun to put more pressure on other extremist organizations, the effort is in no way universal.  The Haqqani network, for example, is largely tolerated despite the fact that it absolutely undermines the American war effort in Afghanistan and undermines the stability of the Afghan government itself (and the Afghan government could, frankly, use all the help that it can get).  


It should be noted that the Pakistani military has no problem crushing insurgents in Baluchistan, who are primarily demanding a more equitable piece of Baluchistan's economic pie.  


For a while, the compromise was that we would increase the number of drone strikes and Pakistan would officially condemn our actions but privately approve of them.  It seems that a combination of the Raymond Davis incident making it impossible for Pakistan to hide its complicity in America's attacks against Islamic militants and drone strikes increasingly targeting militants that Pakistan deems strategic assets has rendered the current compromise untenable.  


And so, finding ourselves renegotiating our relationship with Pakistan, it seems prudent to ask, "Is it worth it?"  


My answer is a resounding "No."  


The benefits of continued partnership with Pakistan are we retain a reluctant ally in the fight against violent extremism and we retain the use of Karachi as an important logistics hub to support our ground forces.  The first benefit is negligible, inasmuch as the only insurgents that Pakistan is doing a good job of killing are the ones who threaten the economic interests of Pakistan's elite.  


Karachi as a logistics hub, however, is very, very important to our war effort.  It is tempting to say that it single-handedly justifies continued alliance with Pakistan, whatever the terms may be.  


As matters currently stand, continued alliance with Pakistan will at best make attempts to build a stable and secure Afghanistan more difficult, while indirectly funding terrorism and fostering the extremism that is currently destabilizing Pakistan to the point that governors and cabinet members are being assassinated.  After our departure, Pakistan will doubtless blunt the efficacy of the Afghan departure to pursue its own aims.  At worst, it Pakistan's failings will render Afghanistan a failed state and the thronging terrorist organizations in Pakistan will overthrow its government, and find themselves not only militant extremists, but a nuclear power as well.  


Neither of these options seem a worthwhile use of our blood and treasure.  It is not worth a continued relationship on those terms, and we should stop treating Pakistan like they hold all the cards in the relationship because we might be able to squeak by with a mediocre result by maintaining the status quo.  Without Pakistan, we have to get out of Afghanistan or route our logistics through more cooperative countries.  Without us, Pakistan is a country without a friend in the world except a tentative China, sans billions in foreign aid and responsible once more for billions in development debt, and we can provide a glut of military support to India.  We have all the power in the relationship, and it's time that we start making Pakistan call us "Big Poppa" and actually work for our mutual strategic benefit.  


The carrot of aid should be conditional on the efficacy with which Pakistan is killing actual insurgents of all shapes and sizes.  The aid that we give them should have a much higher ratio of domestic development (especially for education, to replace the madrassas that will generate generations of future terrorists to come with secular institutions that will generate doctors, engineers, and businessmen) to military aid (which they use to repress their own population and fund terrorists).  The stick, in addition to a distinct lack of aid money, should be increased military aid to India.  


Because fuck Pakistan.  If they don't want to cooperate, we can find somebody who will.